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Lonn: The Extent and Importance of Federal Naval Raids on Salt-Making i

THE EXTENT AND IMPORTANCE OF FEDERAL
NAVAL RAIDS ON SALT-MAKING
IN FLORIDA, 1862-1865
When one thinks of the naval operations of the
War for Southern Independence he is likely to consider
only the exploits of the Alabama and other raiders,
the duel of the Merrimac and Monitor, the continuous
efforts to prevent the blockade-runners slipping into
secluded harbors, and the battles of the fleets and
forts. It is most unlikely that he knows of the persistent and very important operations of the Union
navy all along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts from Norfolk to Vermillions Bay in Louisiana to wreck the saltmaking of the Confederates.
Nowhere else were such Federal naval attacks so
frequent and dogged and so exclusively directed
against the salt industry as on the Gulf coast of Florida. Undisturbed for a year and a half after hostilities began, the salt-workers throve and grew great,
both in the amount of the commodity produced and in
the boldness with which the industry was pursued.
However, by the fall of 1862 the production had become too important to escape the watchful eye of the
United States government. 1 Works for the reduction
of salt from ocean brine were erected along the bays
and sequestered inlets of much of the Florida coast,
but found a favored location on the Gulf side between
Choctawhatchee Bay and Tampa. Particularly were
they centered around St. Andrews Bay and in Taylor
County ; frequently they were placed at the heads of
1 devices resorted to in order to locate salt works is
interesting. A certain adventurer from Marianna, Florida, was
suspected of having salt wells. Hence, Federals fell into the
habit of landing. for predatory incursions. One day a party
asked this man what his business was and wished to see his
establishment.
The owner put them off and thus saved his
wells for a time. Life in the South from the Commencement
of the War (London, 1863), Vol. II, pp. 309-310.
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bays, from one to five miles inland from the open
Gulf, seeking thus to escape the vigilant eyes of the
Union navy and protection from the deep-draught gunboats which could not penetrate so far up the inlets.
The first important raids on the Florida coast of
which the writer has found record 2 were those by the
Kingfisher on September 8, 1862, made under the general direction of Rear-Admiral Lardner and directed
against the salt-works on St. Josephs Bay, and by the
Sagamore on St. Andrews Bay three days later. The
commander of the former bark sent notice to the Confederate salt-makers under a flag of truce of two
hours’ grace to leave the place. The Confederates
were seen within the time limit to depart, taking off
with them four cart-loads of salt. 3
A second serious attempt followed very shortly
afterwards further south, when the marines from
the United States gunboat Somerset, reinforced by the
steamship Tahoma, raided some salt-works near
Cedar Keys on Suwanee Bay on October 4. The commander of the gun-boat, deeming the moment propitious for an attack, as almost all the rebel troops
stationed at the terminus of the Fernandina Railroad
2 small raid of Lieutenant-Commander Brandish from the
vessels Penguin and Henry Andrew on March 22, 1862, with
forty-three men against some small salt-works near New
Smyrna seems a detached event, which apparently did not effect
the Florida activity in the least.
3
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies
(Naval War Records) series I, volume 17, pp. 310, 311, 316;
New York Herald, Oct. 30, 1862.
The writer has, of necessity, obtained most of the material
for this article from Northern sources. Search was made in
Tallahassee and elsewhere for Florida records of this subject;
but, beyond an item or two in contemporaneous printed
State documents, none apparently have survived. Much exceedingly valuable historical material relating to this period
was preserved with the private papers of War Governor John
Milton, but all were lost through fire some years ago. Fortunately, however, Dr. W. W. Davis made good use of these
in the preparation of his Civil War and Reconstruction in
Florida (New York, 1913) ; so, though it was a calamity, their
loss is not what it might have been. Ed.
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nearby had been sent away, ran his vessel in as close
as the draft of water would permit, and then threw
some dozen shells until the white flag was hoisted.
After the landing crew had demolished a number of
works without any resistance, and just as they were
landing to destroy the large works over which the
white flag was flying, they found themselves a target
for a body of some twenty-five men concealed in the
rear of the building. The Federal crew succeeded,
however, despite the wounding of about half their
force, in destroying several barrels of salt and a number of boats, besides capturing a launch and a large
flat-boat. Two days later, after the arrival of the Tahoma, a larger force landed, which was entirely successful in its work of destruction against very slight
resistance. In the succinct phraseology of the commander of the Somerset, “The rebels here needed a
lesson and they have had it.” 4
The method pursued by the raiders in the second
attack is worth recounting. The armed Confederate
guerillas were first routed and put- to flight by the
shell, shrapnel, and canister with which the houses,
woods, and underbrush were searched ; then the smallarms men landed, deployed as skirmishers, on each
flank of the guns, while the working parties destroyed
the boilers, which here proved to be of various shapes
and curious construction. After the houses in the
immediate vicinity had been set afire, the boats proceeded to the next station. At one point, it was necessary to put howitzer shells through two very thick
cast-iron kettles and through two wrought-iron boilers. 5
On November 14 a Federal expedition departed
from Pensacola for St. Andrews Bay, under orders to
“run up the coast and destroy the works between this
4
5

.

Naval War Records, series I, volume 17, p. 318.
Ibid., pp. 316-319,
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place (Pensacola) and St. Andrews Bay.“ 6 Few saltworks were found until the expedition reached Philip’s
Inlet near St. Andrews Bay. The extent of salt manufacture along the shores of the bays, bayous, and
creeks of St. Andrews Bay so surprised LieutenantCommander Hart of the Albatross that he felt confident of not exceeding his instructions if he did all
he “could to destroy them”. He noted, the first day
of his entry into the bay, the smoke of a very large
number of salt-works, and when he returned on board
his vessel that night the sky was lit up both to the
eastward and westward away inland for a long distance. He afterwards learned that the salt-makers,
not having been molested there, had collected in great
numbers on this particular sheet of water. At the
town of St. Andrew boats which had been hauled up
on the beach under sheds were set afire to prevent their
“improper” use, Within a few miles of the town he
destroyed several salt pans with their furnaces,
pumps, tubs, and gutters. He found some of the pans
to be coast-survey harbor buoys cut in two, each half
with a capacity of one hundred and fifty gallons of sea
water. For about a week he pursued his work of
destruction by sending armed boats in all directions,
unmolested though constantly watched while at anchor
off the town by a company of Confederate cavalry of
nearly a hundred men, though the men took good care
to keep out of danger. 7
The story of the descent on November 24 at dawn
on North Bay, an arm of St. Andrews Bay, with’five
boats and sixty marines, besides a working gang for
destruction, may well be told in Commander Hart’s
own words: “The bay was very wide at this point,
and a fog hung over the water, preventing us from
seeing which way to go. As soon as we lay on our
6
Ibid., volume 19, p. 373. Based on the statement of Lieutenant Commander Hart.
7
Ibid., pp. 374-5.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol10/iss4/4

4

Lonn: The Extent and Importance of Federal Naval Raids on Salt-Making i

171
oars, we thought we heard voices on shore. Pulling in
the direction, we soon ascertained that we were near
quite a number of people, and as we came nearer we
not only heard voices, but we heard dogs barking and
horses neighing, and we felt quite sure that we had
stumbled upon a company of cavalry and soldiers, for
day was breaking, and what we afterwards found
out were canvas-covered wagons, we then mistook for
tents. I thought I would startle them, and ordered
a shell to be sent over their heads, and in a minute
there never was heard such shouting and confusion.
They seemed not to know which way to run. Some of
their mules and horses they succeeded in harnessing to
the wagons and some they ran off to the woods beyond
as fast as they could be driven, a shell every now and
then over their heads making them hurry the faster.
The water was so shoal that our men had to wade over
200 yards through the water, over a muddy bottom,
to the shore, and before they reached it the people had
all left and we could just see them through the woods
at a long distance off. We threw out pickets, and
Acting Master Browne, with the men belonging to the
Bohio, took one direction, and I, with my men and
officers, took the other, and, with topmauls, axes,
sledge hammers, and shovels, we commenced the destruction of salt kettles and salt pans and mason work,
for we had got into a settlement of salt-workers. . .
To render everything completely unfit for future use
we had to knock down all the brickwork, to destroy
the salt already made, to knock in the heads and set
fire to barrels, boxes, and everything that would hold
salt, to burn the sheds and houses in which it was
stowed, and to disable and burn up the wagons that
we found loaded with it. The kettles being such as
are used in making sugar, we know the capacity of
by the marks on them, but the salt pans we could only
tell by measurement, which we had no time to do, so
that our total estimate of the amount of sea water that
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was boiling in them when we arrived is far short of
what it really was.“ 8
For further data concerning the seven hours’labor
of destruction we are indebted to his assistant, Acting
Master Browne : the killing of all the mules and cattle
they could find ; the effective method of ruining the salt
by, mixing it with sand ; and the information that there
were twenty-five hundred men engaged in the industry
in that immediate vicinity. 9
So helpless did the salt-makers feel themselves that
at another point, four miles distant, they began to put
out the fires in order to save their kettles when they
saw the Federal raiders appear, abandoning without
even a struggle over forty furnaces and sheds, as well
as pumps and kettles. 10 In the course of the raids,
which extended to December 8, the Federals found
occasion to destroy fire-wood as well as pots and pans;
large furnaces which had never been used ; and brickkilns with sheds for drying the bricks. So thorough
was the work that they stopped on the return to destroy three or four small works which they had passed
by earlier in the dark of dawn. 11 A working capacity
of five hundred bushels per day was estimated. 12
As is apparent from the above recital, St. Andrews
Bay, landlocked and with numerous arms and conse8
Ibid., For the full report of Lieutenant Commander Hart
see ibid., pp. 373-76.
9
Ibid., p. 377. It is of passing interest that the men at
this point had heard of the attacks by Admiral L a r d n e r ’s
squadron of the preceding September and that some of the saltmakers had moved
salt-works farther south on
the coast after the raid of October 4 on Cedar Keys. Ibid., p.
10
Ibid. The Unionists chased the escaping salt-makers for
three miles across a swamp and overtook them.
11
Ibid. Hart found himself unable to destroy all the works
found because of the exhaustion of his men. He thus failed
to visit California Inlet where there were said to be 1,000 saltmakers under the protection of a large body of cavalry, or
those on the east end of Santa Rosa Island, which they passed
on the return journey to Pensacola.
12
Ibid., p. 377.
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quently an extensive shore-line, afforded peculiar advantages for the industry and was regarded as a particularly sheltered and safe location. One armed vessel would have been kept busy all the time patrolling
her several arms. While Captain Browne estimated
the destruction as cutting off five hundred and sixtyeight bushels a day, a careful computation based on
Hart’s actual figures would establish three hundred
and sixty bushels a day as probably more accurate. 13
For about six months the salt-makers in Florida
seem to have enjoyed peace, and then on June 14,
1863, four distinct and extensive establishments located on Alligator Bay near East Pass, boasting sixtyfive kettles were, together with their appurtenances
and huts, completely wrecked and burned to the
ground by a party of engineers and marines from the
Steamer Somerset armed with sledge hammers ; while
the shelling of the woods from the vessel’s guns prevented any effective resistance. 14 These works were
said to be the most extensive on the coast at that time
and to have been in operation since the commencement
of hostilities.
A more serious expedition was that on Lake Ocala,
which was combined with a new attack on St. Andrews
Bay the following December. On the second of that
month a successful attack was made on Kent’s salt
works, consisting of three separate establishments on
Lake Ocala, which lies some twenty miles west of St.
Andrews Bay and five miles inland. The destruction
13 Hart gives the total capacity of the saltworks destroyed as 21,640 gallons a day. I b i d . , p . 379. The
writer has easily arrived at this figure, as sea brine usually
yields salt in the ratio of one bushel to about sixty gallons of
water, according to the estimates of the time.
14
Ibid., vol. 17, pp. 467-472. This raid also cost the Confederates the loss of 200 bushels of salt which were scattered
on the shore. The Comte de Paris notes also a raid in July
of this year on the works of Marsh Island near the Ocklockonee
River in Apalachee Bay. History of the Civil War in America,
vol. IV, p. 389.
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of six large steamboat boilers, improvised into. kettles,
two large flat-boats, six ox-carts, the casting of a large
amount of salt into the lake, and the paroling of seventeen prisoners meant the loss, temporarily at least,
of works which were producing one hundred and thirty bushels of salt a day. 15
The destruction of the salt enterprise of the Confederate government on the West Arm of St. Andrews
Bay, where four hundred bushels were being produced
daily, followed on December 10, which involved a loss
of half a million dollars. The government works constituted a village of some twenty-seven buildings covering three-fourths of a square mile, and kept many
hundred ox and mule teams constantly employed in
hauling salt to Eufaula Sound, whence it was conveyed to Montgomery. 16 The burning of the thirtytwo houses and shanties which made up the village of
St. Andrew was deemed necessary in order to deprive
the Confederacy of a station for headquarters for the
military companies which were protecting the numerous salt works with one field-piece, and to prevent contrabands and refugees from going off to the blockade.
These guardsmen were effective in harassing Union
soldiers of the blockading fleet who landed on the main
for wood.” The same expedition then proceeded down
the bay, destroying no less than one hundred and
ninety-eight private establishments which lined each
side of the bay for seven miles, aggregating a large
total, although they averaged only two boilers and ten
kettles each. The records reveal at one of the places
raided a queer, if natural, device resorted to of burying the kettles in order to save them. The negro con15 War Records, vol. 17, pp. 593-94, 596.
16 government had here 27 buildings, 22 boilers, and
300 kettles, each averaging 200 gallons, 2,000 bushels o
f
and store-houses containing three months’provisions. Ibid.,
p. 597.
17
Ibid.
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trabands pointed out the places in the swamp where
the vessels would otherwise have been effectually concealed. 18 The damage to the Confederates wrought on
this expedition to private and government works was
estimated at well over three million dollars. It is possible to compute the salt capacity on St. Andrews Bay
at this time at slightly over eighteen hundred bushels
a day. 19
The remarkable extent of the salt activity on this
particular sheet of water is indicated by the statement
from Acting Master Browne that he contemplated destroying more than one hundred other salt works on
East and West bays. 20
The reason for the great popularity of St. Andrews Bay as a location for the salt industry is not
far to seek. The swamps in this bay were the best
adapted in the entire Confederacy for salt-making, as
the continued drought in that region, protracted
through three years, had caused the evaporation of
nearly all the fresh water so that the water would test
at least seventy-five per cent salt. In addition, the
salt made there was of a quality superior to that procured elsewhere, not even excepting Virginia salt. The
officer directing the expedition boasted that the destruction would constitute a greater blow to the Southern cause than the fall of Charleston. 21
The work of demolition of the salt-works was completed by Acting Master W. R. Browne 22 on December
18

Ibid., pp. 594, 598.
19 writer has arrived at this figure by adding up the
capacity at the various works and then reducing gallon capacity to bushels, on the basis of the very salt water of St.
Andrews Bay, which has, fortunately, been recorded.
20
Ibid., p. 598.
21
Ibid. The statement of the seriousness of the blow was
quoted by the New York Herald, January 5, 1864.
22 is not the same Browne alluded to before. The name
of the former was George W., while this one signed his reports W. R. Browne.
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18 when he proceeded up St. Andrews Bay against
unfavorable conditions of wind, tide, and darkness, but
nevertheless succeeded in destroying ninety additional
salt establishments that day. Furthermore, as the
pickets gave the alarm, the Confederates themselves
set the remaining works afire to prevent their destruction by the Federals, two hundred and ten in number,
for three hundred works covered the beach for ten
miles. Some other works in West Bay were also ruined
by the Confederates to prevent the Federals from doing so, so that the raiding party left, congratulating
themselves on having cleared at least three-fourths
of the bay of all salt-works. The total result of ten
days’work performed by five officers and fifty-seven
men represented the ruin of five hundred works, thirty-three wagons, twelve flat-boats, two sloops, six oxcarts, four thousand bushels of salt, seven hundred
buildings, probably a thousand kettles and iron boilers, while it would appear that the Confederates destroyed as many more. Subsequently the Confederate
military company set to guard the works disbanded,
as there no longer existed any occasion for their service at that point. Adding the loss inflicted by the
Confederates. themselves to that wrought by the
Unionists would bring the total loss by the close of
1863 to well over six million dollars.
While the officers made no calculation of the salt
capacity of the works destroyed at this time, they furnished statistics which make it possible of calculation.
Acting Master Browne’s statement that there were five
hundred and twenty-nine kettles averaging one hundred and fifty gallons each and one hundred and five
iron boilers for boiling brine, the capacity of boilers
being not less than three hundred gallons, indicates a
capacity of 110,850 gallons. This figure must be
doubled to include the productive capacity destroyed
by the Confederates themselves. The brine here was
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said to be seventy-five per cent salt, as has been stated,
which makes 166,350 gallons of salt capacity. Translated into dry measure, we thus arrive at the figure
of 16,595 bushels as the daily capacity of salt thus
swept away from the Confederacy. Not undeserving
of mention is the carrying off of forty-eight contrabands as prisoners and the gaining of five deserters
to the Union service. 23
However serious the blows struck at salt-making
on the Florida coast, it is a remarkable fact that it
seemed at first impossible to crush it. It was highly
lucrative, but, what was more important, it was indispensable. Therefore, it sank in ashes and ruin, only
to rise, Phoenix-like, from its ashes. It took no longer
than from December 18, 1863, to about February 7,
1864, for the smoke of furnace fires again to hang over
the shores of this favored bay and for the steam to
rise from the boiling brine. It seems almost incredible
that in this short space of time the Richmond government, in the throes of war and under ever increasing
stringency of money, could have reassembled the
money, materials, and workers to recreate works of
such size as the records show to have been reestablished in about two months, among which were some
of “the largest government salt-works ever created in
Florida”, according to Browne: furnaces built of
brick and stone, twenty-six sheet-iron boilers with an
23 a full account of destruction wrought on December 11-18 see Naval War Records, series I, vol. 17, pp. 593601; Moore, Rebellion Records, vol. 8, p. 280; New York Herald,
Jan. 7, 19, 1864. As is not strange, the estimates of the loss
differ. A paper inclosed with Browne’s report of December 15
gives far larger figures than he gives in the text of his report.
Compare also pp. 598 and 600. The New York Herald seems
to improve even on B r o w n e ’s figures. As usual, the writer
adopts the more conservative figures.
The delighted comments of the New York Herald of January
may be noted: “Salt works are as plentiful as blackbirds in
a rice field” The same journal contains (Jan. 20, 1864) an
interesting and suggestive article by Browne on the importance
of Florida’s salt-works. (Davis, op. cit. p . 209.)
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average capacity of almost nine hundred gallons,
pumps and aqueducts, nineteen salt kettles with an
aggregate capacity of thirty-eight hundred gallons,
sixteen log houses, five large steamboat boilers, one
flat-boat, vats, and tanks. 24
These salt-works on West Bay, covering a space
of half a square mile, with a capacity probably twice
eight hundred and thirty-five bushels per day and estimated in value at not less than some hundreds of thousands of dollars, 25 had been in operation only ten days
when detected by the ever vigilant Browne, so that he
sent off a force in two detachments on the morning of
February 17, one to march inland seven miles in order
to attack from the rear, while the other on the cutter
should attack from the front simultaneously. Success
again crowned his efforts so that the destruction must
once more have inflicted a loss which the Confederates
could ill afford to sustain. 26
During the same month 27 two expeditions were sent
from the steamship Tahoma. One destroyed the government works near St. Marks Bay during the threeday period of February 17 to 19, which were so extensive that they required a day and a night of unremitting toil from two detachments of men before
the work of demolition was accomplished. A long,
24 Browne’s report, Naval War Records, series I, vol. 17,
pp. 646, 647.
It would be expected that the Federal officers would, without design, overestimate the extent and especially the value of
the salt-works they destroyed, so these millions might well be
subject to some discount; but Davis (Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, p. 208) says, “there is no evidence materially to impugn the accuracy of this estimate.”
25 Browne states as his belief that the boilers and kettles
alone on West Bay must have cost $146,883. Ibid., p. 646.
26 ibid., pp. 646-47. The date of the first raid can be
established from the abstract of the log of the Restless, and is
as given above. Ibid., p. 648. The productive capacity of the
works destroyed was 19,350 gallons o r 2,418 bushels of salt
daily.
27 17 and 27 were the dates.

.
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hard march of forty-five miles through swamps and
dense woods marked a new feature in methods of attack. On the 27th, a week later, a second expedition,
which eluded a cavalry company stationed to protect
the works, destroyed government works at Goose
Creek. The Confederate government thus lost by these
two raids a capacity of twenty-five hundred bushels
per day. 28 The list of property destroyed in the first
expedition on St. Marks was quoted as worth two
million dollars, while the later destruction, covering
such items as ninety-eight well constructed brick furnaces, one hundred and sixty-five pans, a hundred
store-houses, and two thousand bushels of salt, was
obviously great. Perhaps an estimate of three million
dollars in all is no exaggeration. 29
On April 2, 1864, the ever-active Browne, as befitted the commander of the bark Restless, again fell
upon government salt-works on the East Arm of St.
Andrews Bay, which seem truly, as Browne complained, to be rebuilt as “fast as he demolished them.” 30
Browne’s zeal outran his judgment when a few days
later he wrote to Admiral Bailey after destroying
some large works, “There are no other works on East
Bay at present, and I hardly think they will attempt
to make salt on this bay again, as they are aware of
our having mounted a howitzer on the barge. There are
some few small concerns in operation on West Bay,
and I am only waiting an addition to those now there
when I shall fit out another expedition, and am in
hopes of making quite a formidable raid, one that will
make it worth our while to report.“ 31 Certainly it
seemed hopeless to try to extirpate the industry when,
Ibid., p. 648.
29
Ibid., p. 649.
30 pp. 676-78.
31 p. 683. In a later report he repeated a rumor that
the Confederate government intended to reerect works on East
Bay.
28
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after such pitiless, unremitting destruction, an ensign
was obliged to report to Browne on May 26, 1864, his.
belief that there were still, judging from the fires, two
hundred salt-works on St. Andrews Bay. He had
learned from good authority that the salt-makers had
a large quantity of new boilers on hand to replace the
broken ones as soon as possible after the Federals left
the bay. 32 But nothing could dampen Browne’s ardor
against salt-works, for on May 27, upon receiving his
ensign’s report, he registered his determination to
destroy that work and “if possible to do so as fast as
they build new ones”, 33 a vow which he lived up to on
June 8, when ninety-seven salt-works with all their
equipments were totally destroyed, and on October 5
and 6, when kettles and boilers on that same bay with
an aggregate capacity of about 50,000 gallons were
demolished. 34
The concluding scene in the long drawn-out drama
which had St. Andrews Bay for its setting was not
played until February, 1865, when the last demolition
of salt-works on West Bay was staged and pans with
a boiling capacity of 13,615 gallons broken. 35
Meanwhile extensive works on Rocky Point in
Tampa Bay had been destroyed by the Federal fleet
during the preceding July, while in December some
works had been swept away by detachments from the
United States steamers Stars and Stripes, Hendrik
Hudson, and Ariel. 36
Such measures to punish any effort of the Confederates to relieve their salt famine led, naturally, to
32 ensign, on this occasion, M a y 24, 1864, destroyed
eleven works of about 60 kettles. Ibid., p. 707.
33
Ibid., p. 719.
34
Ibid., p. 719. See also New York Herald, November 8,
1864. It must be pointed out for the sake of accuracy that the
Restless had changed her commander by this time.
35 Naval War Records, series I, vol. 17, pp. 811-12; Report
of Secretary of War, 1865-66, p. 351.
36 New York Herald, December 17, 1864.
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counter measures to beat off the attacks from the
blockading fleet and to protect the salt-makers. It is
easy to trace the first repercussion from the raids on
St. Josephs and St. Andrews bays of early September,
1862, for toward the close of the month we find Governor Shorter of Alabama seeking the help of the
authorities at Richmond. Twice, he complains, had
Alabama citizens, who had for several months been
making salt for their personal use on the Florida coast
from St. Josephs Bay to Choctawhatchee Bay, been
interrupted by Federal raids. He estimated that three
hundred armed men would afford the requisite protection. 37
Promptly on the heels of the serious raids of December, 1862, the Florida legislature made provision
for the organization of the salt-workers, citizens and
non-citizens of Florida, for defense against the raiders under officers appointed by the governor. All
workers must be enrolled for military duty, and were
subject to call upon threat of an invasion by the enemy ; refusal to enter such organizations would be
met with prohibition of the right to make salt. Such
service did not, however, carry any compensation. 38
37 to Randolph, September 22, 1862, Executive Correspondence, Alabama Archives.
On December 15, in an effort to arouse the government to a
sense of its own dangers, that same. official commented to the
Secretary of War on the fact that Mr. Clendenin’s works had
been broken up by the foe. Clendenin was superintendent of
the government works at St. Andrews Bay at the time. War
of the Rebellion. Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Armies, series I, vol. XIV, p. 716.
The privilege of making salt in Florida had been given to
the citizens and governments of other states by resolution of
the Legislature. (Fla. Acts. . . 12th sess. Dec. 1862. Res. 13.
See Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, p. 204)
In April, 1862, Gov. Shorter of Alabama requested of Gov.
Milton that the state of Alabama be allowed to manufacture
salt in Florida, as the saline deposits in Alabama were not suff i c i e n t . The request was granted. (Milton papers, in Davis,
op.
p. 204 note.)
38 and Resolutions. . . General Assembly of Florida. . .
12th session. . . Nov., 1862, p. 77. Joint Resolution, no. 30.
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The law was promptly translated into action, so that
by January 9 of the new year the officer appointed to
the work was able to report the organization into companies of all the salt-workers on the coast between
St. Marks and the Suwanee River, but among the 498
men physically capable of duty, there were but fortythree guns in good condition and very little ammunition. Places of rendezvous in case of attack had been
indicated, while the salt-workers had been ordered to
cooperate with the military in their vicinity. 39 Meanwhile General Cobb, in command of that military district, took prompt steps to strengthen the position.
He had found the few troops stationed in Florida too
far from the coast to render timely aid; he therefore
shifted them to more convenient posts and took steps
to concentrate the operation of salt-making within
narrower territorial limits. 40 Governor Shorter
thought to help the situation by authorizing Colonel
Clanton, a dashing, experienced, and indefatigable
Alabama officer, to raise a regiment of cavalry rangers for six months. 41 He was hopeful that if he could
complete his regiment of cavalry and if he received
authority to muster in two or three companies of infantry and could get a section of artillery, he could
drive the enemy to their gun-boats and give security
to the salt manufacturing industry. 42 On the whole ‘it
39
Official Records of the Rebellion, series I, vol. XIV, pp.
753-54. Statement of W. Fisher, the designated officer.
40 the section of coast between the Apalachicola and
C h o c t a w h a t c h e e r i v e r s he found part an almost desert
country of nearly fifty miles. He did not apprehend a raid
in that quarter beyond St. Andrews Bay. Ibid., pp. 730-31.
41 Shorter was pessimistic. He feared that under
the inducements which would be held out, large portion would
save their little property by giving their adherence to the enemy. See letter of Governor Shorter to General Buckner, December 31, 1862. Executive correspondence, Alabama Archives.
42
Official Records of the Rebellion, series I, XV, pp.
947-48. Shorter had a special interest in staying the enemy
in the coast region of Florida, for the Federals had already
made a raid up the Choctawhatchee River into Coffee County,
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was true, as a citizen of Tallahassee said, that the arrangements for defense of the great salt interests
were merely such as were incidental to the general
protection and observation of the coast. Cavalry companies were stationed at Newport and Blue Creek in
Taylor County within two or three miles of the salt
works in that county.
The reader cannot fail to be impressed with the
extraordinary importance which an insignificant commodity can assume in time of war. All articles of food
become factors of the first importance the moment a
blockade threatens to shut off any portion of a belligerant’s territory from its accustomed source of sup
ply. In the four-year contest between the Federal
Union and the Confederacy salt was an element of
primal concern ; especially was this true in Florida
which, before the end of the war, became a principal
source of meat for the Confederate armies, 43 With our
present methods of refrigeration and preservation of
foods of all kinds, animal and vegetable, salt has lost
its earlier importance and this story will never be
written for another war.
One is impressed also with the really remarkable
piece of industrial enterprise in salt manufacturing
which must always remain to the credit of the Confederacy. Salt making, along with arms and clothing,
constituted about the only manufactures upon which
the Confederacy was able to embark; but nowhere
perhaps was a greater persistence manifested than at
St. Andrews Bay in rebuilding the works so continuAlabama. The south-eastern part of that state was also peculiarly liable to hostile incursions from Pensacola. See letter
of January 10, 1863, from Governor Shorter to President Davis,
ibid., p. 939.
43 its huge production on the coast,
people of Florida were in actual want of salt.
op. cit. p. 204. Governor’s
Nov. 17, 1862, Nov. 21,
1864; and correspondence of Gov. Milton, cited ibid. p. 204
note.)
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ally destroyed by the Federal fleet. It is difficult to
explain whence the Richmond authorities found the
means and assembled the materials for this really remarkable feat.
One of the most tragic aspects of war is here strikingly illustrated--the shocking, futile waste. The harrying of the industry at St. Andrews Bay alone cost
the Confederacy--if we fully credit the official reports of the Federal officers-over six million dollars ;
and it should be noted that this was but one of many
points along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts where this
destruction was taking place. The ease with which the
Confederacy could repair the works, and, hence, the
great difficulty of dealing the industry a death-blow
constitutes one of the surprises of a study of the subject, though in the end superior resources for continuing the fight against salt-making had to tell here as
elsewhere and ultimately the Union navy all but drove
the industry from the coast.
ELLA LONN.
Goucher College
Baltimore
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